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Severability of Statutes
TOM CAMPBELL*
Courts legislate when they engage in "severability analysis," allowing part of a law to
continue in force after having struck down other parts as unconstitutional. This is
flawed for the same reason that the legislative veto and the executive line-item veto are
flawed. All involve creating a legislative outcome without the joint approval of both
houses and the executive. The practice derives from an analogy to contract
enforcement, where a court will try to preserve part of a contract when the rest is
unenforceable. However, the analogy is imperfect because Congress or the state
legislature remains in a position to pass a new law, unlike the parties to a contract who
might not be in a position to create a new bargain. No appeal to convenience should
allow severability practice to continue, any more than it would have allowed the
legislative veto to continue after INS v. Chadha. It is more respectful of a co-equal
branch to invalidate an entire act than to create a result that was not passed by the
legislature or signed by the executive. Even in the presence of a severability clause, it is
not reasonable to infer that the legislature considered all possible permutations of a bill
and approved them all, accepting that a court might strike down some clauses while
allowing others to stand. Severability analysis has created systems the legislature never
intended. The examples of campaign finance in Buckley v. Valeo and Sarbanes-Oxley
last term in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
are used to illustrate. Accordingly, when holding a provision of an act unconstitutional
a reviewing court should strike down the entire act and allow the legislative and
executive branches to craft whatever alternative they wish to adopt. This Article is the
first commentary to call for the entire abolition, rather than some modification, of the
severability process.
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INTRODUCTION
When a court finds part of a statute unconstitutional, it often severs
the rest of the bill, and allows what is left to continue to have force.' This
is inappropriate. When a provision of a law is struck down, a reviewing
court creates something new, something that was not approved by
Congress or the state legislature, or signed by the President or a
governor. Considering traditional separation of powers principles, the role
of the court is fulfilled when it holds the provision unconstitutional and
thus renders void the entire bill of which that unconstitutional provision
was a part. When a court does anything more than that, it is legislating.
i. See, e.g., Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 789-90 (E.D. Va. 2oo) (holding that the
"individual mandate" portion of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, President Obama's
heath care law, is unconstitutional and must be severed from the rest of the Act).
2. A similar issue arises when a court narrows the reach of a statute in order to preserve its
1496 [Vol. 62:I495
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Accordingly, I call for the complete abolition of the severability doctrine.
Over many years, scholars have proposed limitations on or expansions of
severability doctrine.' None has proposed eliminating the entire doctrine.'
constitutionality. Cases "paring down" federal statutes to avoid constitutional shoals are legion. These
cases recognize that the court does not legislate, but instead respects the legislature, by preserving a
statute through a limiting interpretation. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931 & n.43
(2olo); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 n.6 (1997). The Court contends that when it
"narrowly construe[s] a broadly worded Act of Congress," it does not "create a common law crime."
Id. Justice Scalia's separate opinion in Skilling disagrees with this contention, noting that such
narrowing of a criminal statute is, indeed, legislating: "The Court strikes a pose of judicial humility in
proclaiming that our task is 'not to destroy the Act ... but to construe it' . .. . But in transforming the
prohibition of 'honest-services fraud' into a prohibition of 'bribery and kick-backs' it is wielding a
power we long ago abjured: the power to define new federal crimes." Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2935
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing United States v. Hudson, ii U.S.
(7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)). However, a limiting construction is slightly more defensible against the
charge that a court is legislating, than is severing a clause and letting the rest stand. The court can
assert that it is, in fact, only interpreting a series of words, not striking them.
3. For authors proposing limitations on the doctrine, see, for example, Michael C. Dorf, Facial
Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 293 (1994) (arguing that a default
presumption of inseverability is preferable); Israel E. Friedman, Inseverability Clauses in Statutes, 64
U. CHI. L. REv. 903, 919-20 (1997) (arguing that inseverability clauses should be inviolably respected,
though even with such a rule, severability clauses might occasionally be ignored); David H. Gans,
Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639, 643-45 (2oo8) (arguing that
severability should be limited not by an inquiry into legislative intent, but an analysis of whether the
court would be engaged too much in lawmaking); Fred Kameny, Are Inseverability Clauses
Constitutional?, 68 ALB. L. REV. 997, 1025-26 (2005) (arguing that inseverability clauses should not be
honored when they are adopted in an attempt to influence a reviewing court); Mark L. Movsesian,
Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REV. 41, 45-46 (1995) (arguing that severability should
be decided purely on textualism, that a severability or inseverability clause should be followed
literally, and that there should be a presumption of severability otherwise). For authors arguing for
expansions of the doctrine, see, for example, John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203,
206 (1993) (arguing that in the absence of a clear statement of inseverability in the statute, severability
should be assumed); Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule of Law, 4 HARV. J.
ON LEGIs. 227, 271-72 (2oo4) (making an argument similar to Movsesian's); Glenn Chatmas Smith,
From Unnecessary Surgery to Plastic Surgery: A New Approach to the Legislative Veto Severability
Cases, 24 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 397, 461-63 (1987) (arguing that courts should not stop with simply
severing unconstitutional sections of a bill, but should reconstruct a law in order to vindicate legislative
will, even when this means adding new language); Laurence H. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A
Law by Any Other Name, 21 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. I, 24-26 (1984) (arguing that severability should be
understood as a reflection of standing jurisprudence, because the law itself continues in force, but a
ruling that part of the law is unconstitutional denies standing to one seeking to enforce that provision
to her or his benefit); C. Vered Jona, Note, Cleaning Up for Congress: Why Courts Should Reject the
Presumption of Severability in the Face of Intentionally Unconstitutional Legislation, 76 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 698, 713-14 (2oo8) (arguing that severability clauses should not be honored where there is reason
to believe Congress or the legislature knew it was acting unconstitutionally); Note, Severability of
Legislative Veto Provisions: A Policy Analysis, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1182, 1193-95 (1984) (arguing that in
aftermath of INS v. Chadha, severability analysis should focus on preserving policy outcomes rather
than legislative history). Professor Mark Movsesian offers a good compilation of the state of the legal
commentary:
[Elstablished doctrine on the severability of unconstitutional statutory provisions has drawn
criticism on almost every conceivable basis. Commentators have condemned severability
analysis as too malleable and as too rigid; as encouraging judicial overreaching and as
encouraging judicial abdication. They have criticized the doctrine's reliance on legislative
intent and its disregard of legislative intent; its excessive attention to political concerns and
July 2o011] 1497
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I propose now is the time to take such action, and base such a proposal
on fundamental separation of powers principles.
I. WHEN THE COURT SEVERS A PORTION OF A STATUTE, IT IS
EFFECTIVELY ACTING AS A LEGISLATURE'
The Supreme Court has held that it is impermissible for Congress,
through the legislative veto, to create a legislative result other than one
which passes both houses and is signed by the President: "There is no
provision allowing Congress to... amend laws by other than legislative
means pursuant to Art. I.", The Court has also held that it is
impermissible for the President, through use of line-item veto legislation,
to create a new legislative result other than one that passed both houses
and was signed by the President: "If the Line Item Veto Act were valid,
it would authorize the President to create a different law-one whose
text was not voted on by either House of Congress or presented to the
President for signature."' Yet making something into law that was not
its inattention to political concerns; its lack of any coherent explanation.
Movsesian, supra, at 41-42 (footnotes omitted).
4. Lars Noah, The Executive Line Item Veto and the Judicial Power to Sever: What's the
Difference?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 235, 241 (1999) ("Although commentators have criticized the
Supreme Court's approach to deciding the severability of particular provisions, apparently no one has
suggested that the judiciary's assertion of that power violates Article I's 'finely wrought' procedures
for legislating.").
5. This Article deals with severability, but it suggests an application to equal protection analysis
as well. When striking down a statute that affords benefits based on an impermissible classification, a
court may choose to extend the benefit to all or deny it to all. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 251-52. The
Supreme Court has arrogated to itself the right to choose which it will do. See Heckler v. Mathews,
465 U.S. 728, 739 n.5 (1984) ("Although the choice between extension and nullification is within the
constitutional competence of a federal district court, and ordinarily extension, rather than
nullification, is the proper course, the court should not, of course, use its remedial powers to
circumvent the intent of the legislature, and should therefore measure the intensity of commitment to
the residual policy and consider the degree of potential disruption of the statutory scheme that would
occur by extension as opposed to abrogation." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In
extending a benefit to a class of persons to whom Congress or a state legislature did not, the court is
acting legislatively. In striking down a benefit awarded to one class because it was not equally offered
to another class, the court is acting judicially. Applying the principles of Chadha and Clinton, a
different legislative outcome has resulted from what Congress or the legislature passed when a benefit
is extended to a group the legislature excluded.
6. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 n.i8 (1983).
7. Clinton v. City of N. Y., 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998). As the Court explained:
[O]ur decision rests on the narrow ground that the procedures authorized by the Line Item
Veto Act are not authorized by the Constitution. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 is a 500-
page document that became "Public Law 105-33" after three procedural steps were taken:
(i) a bill containing its exact text was approved by a majority of the Members of the House
of Representatives; (2) the Senate approved precisely the same text; and (3) that text was
signed into law by the President. The Constitution explicitly requires that each of those
three steps be taken before a bill may "become a law." Art. I, § 7. If one paragraph of that
text had been omitted at any one of those three stages, Public Law 105-33 would not have
been validly enacted .... Something that might be known as "Public Law 105-33 as
modified by the President" may or may not be desirable, but it is surely not a document that
1498 [Vol. 62:I495
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precisely the text that had been approved by Congress and signed by the
President is exactly what a court does when it exercises its severability
authority.
Suppose Congress had, reflecting a desire to curb the federal deficit,
cut all federal employees' salaries in an annual appropriation bill. Upon
review, the Supreme Court would hold unconstitutional, according to
Article III, Section i,' the line item in that appropriation bill paying
federal judges less than the previous year. Using severability analysis, the
Court would then allow the rest of the appropriations bill to go ahead.
Suppose the President had, before the line-item veto law was held
unconstitutional, done the same and vetoed out the line for federal judges
because he thought it was unconstitutional. Applying the logic of the
Court in Clinton v. City of New York, the President could not do so
because to do so "would authorize the President to create a different
law-one whose text was not voted on by either House of Congress."'o It
is inconsistent to conclude that the President cannot create a different
legislative outcome by a line-item veto, and that Congress cannot create
a different legislative outcome by a one-house veto," but that the Court
can using severability analysis. All three processes amend in the same
way the bill passed by Congress and signed by the President. 2
may "become a law" pursuant to the procedures designed by the Framers of Article 1, §7, of
the Constitution.
Id. at 448-49.
8. I emphasize the structural flaw of severability: it is lawmaking because it leads to a legislative
result. Others have observed the comparative disadvantage flaw, which is a different criticism, though
one I also share: a court is institutionally less advantaged to write laws than is a legislature. See, e.g.,
Gans, supra note 3, at 663 ("When courts rewrite statutes via severance, they do so without the ability
to investigate the problem and find facts in the ways legislatures can, without the power to consider
the full range of policy choices that might be open to the legislature, and without any accountability to
or understanding of the wishes of the electorate. All of this should come as little surprise. Judges, in
our constitutional system, are not meant to write laws. Yet, severability doctrine gives them this
role."). Professor Lars Noah has observed the logical consistency between the President's asserted
line-item veto power, which is granted in statute, and the Court's use of severability; but he uses that
identity to criticize the Court's opinion in Clinton, rather than the doctrine of severability. Noah, supra
note 3, at 241.
9. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § i ("The Judges ... shall ... receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which.shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.").
so. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448.
ii. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956-58.
12. A possible distinction between the line-item veto and a court engaged in severability analysis
is that in the first instance, Congress was attempting to give policy-making authority to the President,
and in the latter, a court was only doing what it had to do under the Constitution. That would be an
important distinction if Clinton had been decided on the grounds of the nondelegation doctrine:
namely, that Congress was attempting to delegate legislative authority without any reasonable
guidelines. However, Clinton was not decided on the basis of the nondelegation doctrine. It was
decided, rather, on the basis cited in the text of this Article: that a legislative result was caused by a
process other than the one prescribed by the Constitution. See id. at 447-48. That rationale applies
equally to a legislative result caused by a President or by a court in selecting only part of a statute to
continue in force.
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The proper outcome in the hypothetical I present is for the Supreme
Court to strike down the appropriation bill for federal employees in its
entirety. Congress would then be free to pass a new appropriation,
without the line lowering pay for federal judges. Perhaps Congress would
not wish to be frugal in the case of its own members' salaries if federal
judges were not included in the sacrifice-a point that anticipates the
next Part regarding whether severability is really respectful of legislative
intent.13 Putting to one side what Congress might have done, what is plain
is that creating an appropriation bill excluding the diminution in judicial
salaries was not what Congress did do. To allow an appropriation bill to
become law for federal employees without that provision is to amend
that federal law. If Congress cannot amend a law except by new
legislation, and the President cannot amend a law except by signing new
legislation," neither can the courts.
A recent Supreme Court decision displays with great clarity the
legislative nature of a severability decision. In Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,6 the Court struck down
the portion of Sarbanes-Oxley" that created the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB").'8 Members of the PCAOB
were to be chosen by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
but were not removable except by the SEC, and even then removable
only for cause. 9 The Court saw a constitutional infirmity in that the
PCAOB exercised executive authority, yet its members were not directly
responsible to the President.o The combination of three parts of the bill
caused the flaw: the PCAOB members were not direct Presidential
appointees, they could only be removed for cause, and they exercised
executive authority." It was thus up to the Court to decide which clause
would be struck down to cure the defect. The Court reasoned:
It is true that the language providing for good-cause removal is only
one of a number of statutory provisions that, working together,
produce a constitutional violation. In theory, perhaps, the Court might
blue-pencil a sufficient number of the Board's responsibilities so that
its members would no longer be "Officers of the United States." Or we
could restrict the Board's enforcement powers, so that it would be a
purely recommendatory panel."
13. See infra Part IID.
14. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956-58.
15. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448.
16. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
17. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. t07-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of U.S.C.).
18. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154.
19. Id.
20. Id.
2l. Id.
22. Id. at 3162.
[Vol. 62:I4951500
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Instead, the Court chose another alternative: to strike down the
clause protecting PCAOB members from being removed except for
cause. 23 It could just as well have struck down any provision giving the
PCAOB authority to exercise an executive function, leaving it with only
the legislative function that long-established precedent has found
acceptable for Congress to delegate to an independent agency.24 Either
way, the constitutional problem would have been fixed. The Court
claimed to be avoiding the use of legislative power: "[S]uch editorial
freedom-far more extensive than our holding today-belongs to the
Legislature, not the Judiciary. Congress of course remains free to pursue
any of these options going forward.""
The Court thus admitted that alternative solutions would be too
much for the judiciary, and belong instead with the legislative branch.
What the Court missed is that there is no difference between what it says
is reserved to the legislative branch and what it actually did in the case.
Choosing to strike down one clause of a bill, here the specification of
executive functions for the PCAOB, is as much of a legislative act by the
Court as would be striking down another, such as the protection of
PCAOB members from being dismissed except for cause. Whichever
provision it struck down, the Court "amended" an act of Congress-to
use the characterization the Court found condemnable in INS v.
Chadha26-and thereby "passed" a new law that Congress had never
enacted." The Court's approach to curing unconstitutionality in the
statute in Free Enterprise is illustrative of a problem that can recur
whenever the unconstitutionality of a law results from the interplay of
23. Id. at 3151.
24. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935).
25. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162. This statement immediately follows a fourth alternative,
"Or the Board members could in future be made removable by the President, for good cause or at
will." Id. The Court stated that this hypothetical alternative would constitute more "editorial
freedom" that "belongs to the Legislature" than what it did in striking down the provision limiting
removal only to cause. Id. There is, indeed, a difference between the Court (i) striking down the
protection of PCAOB members from being fired except for cause (which the Court did) and
(2) striking out the executive powers of PCAOB members (which it mused it could have done), on the
one hand; and (3) adding a provision that PCAOB members were to be appointed directly by the
President, on the other hand. The first two require only striking out provisions of the bill that passed
Congress; the third requires writing new words. My argument is fundamentally that in choosing
between these approaches, the Court is legislating; and that remains true whichever option is followed.
26. 462 U.S. 9I9,953 (1983).
27. It is immaterial for this part of my analysis to speculate whether Congress would have passed
the PCAOB provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley without making the PCAOB members free from arbitrary
dismissal. I deal with the task of trying to decide what Congress would have done had it known part of
a bill would be struck down in the next Part of this Article. However, it's useful to note this concern at
this point. In the context of the Enron and other scandals, it was clear Congress was not pleased with
the existing level of oversight exercised by the SEC, and wanted to create an independent board
incapable of being influenced by political appointees. See infra note 131. The Court assumes much
when it concludes that Congress would have gone ahead with a PCAOB knowing it would have to be a
creature of, and its members dismissible at will by, the SEC.
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several different clauses. The unconstitutionality can be cured by
removing any of them, but it is up to the court to choose which one.
Choosing between alternative versions of a statute is legislating. Striking
down the law, and returning it to the Congress or state legislature, is not.
Professor Laurence Tribe recognized this problem a quarter century
ago:
When a severability clause is regarded as an instruction to judges
that they ought to act as if Congress has enacted a . .. law severed from
a portion subsequently held to be unconstitutional ... the clause seems
nothing more than an invitation for courts to disregard the absence of
any actual enactment of the severed law in accord with Article I's
strictures. The constitutional safeguards of bicameralism and
presentment are thereby abandoned, and a new law is created byjudicial fiat."'
Tribe found this argument initially persuasive. By severing some
parts of a bill and allowing the rest to stand, a court has created a new
law that was not passed by Congress or signed by the President: "If the
debate is conducted in these terms, the anti-severability position seems
the winner by a wide margin."" He offers an ingenious solution with
which, nevertheless, I disagree. He proposes that severability analysis is
really not striking down part of a law and leaving the rest. Rather, a court
should uphold the Constitution and the entirety of the law, and, as to a
party with proper standing, apply both together.3 o A party who is not
affected by the unconstitutional part continues to receive the benefit or
burden of the statute because that party lacks standing to raise the
challenge to the unconstitutional part." This approach, Tribe maintains,
allows the court to escape from the difficult and paradoxical quest of
finding out what Congress had intended, when Congress passed a
different law." Under Tribe's approach, it is immaterial what Congress
might have intended.33
Nevertheless, Tribe appeared uneasy with his result. He offered the
following amendment to his rule: "[I]f a fair reading of the law is that it
cannot have been meant to apply at all once certain parts or applications
had been excised, then ordinary canons of interpretation would leave the
law a nullity once such partial invalidity had been decreed."" Tribe opts
for a strong presumption of severability: "[O]nly the clearest evidence
that a majority of both Houses of Congress actually meant to choose self-
28. Tribe, supra note 3, at 22 (footnote omitted).
29. Id. at 23.
30. Id. at 25.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 26.
33. Id. at 26 ("Under the approach here proposed, inseverability would never follow from the
mere prospect that the legislature might not have enacted the law at all if it had known that the
offending aspects or applications of that law would not survive.").
34. Id. at 26.
1502 [Vol. 62:I495
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destruction over severability should suffice to yield an interpretation of
inseverability."" This position, however, undoes Tribe's entire argument
about standing. If a party is not touched by the unconstitutional part of a
statute,"' then that party's rights should not be affected by the existence
of the unconstitutional part -even if there is the "clearest evidence that a
majority of both Houses of Congress actually" would have preferred self-
destruction of the statute. The party lacks standing; end of argument.
Assuming Tribe had not made this retreat, and maintained his
position on pure standing, he would have had a more consistent
argument, but one that would nonetheless fail. A violation of the
requirement of bicameralism and presentment is not lessened by the
absence of a party with standing to challenge it. Tribe would allow a law
to work differently in practice than was intended, due to a legislative act
not passed by both houses of Congress and presented to the President.
That was the Court's reasoning in Chadha.37 That the Chadha Court
nevertheless severed the legislative veto provision, and allowed the rest
of the Immigration Act to apply, thus creating a law that was not passed
by both houses nor signed by the President, created an irony not lost on
Tribe.38
Recently, Professor Luke Meier asked,
If the Clinton and Chadha decisions apply with equal force to the
courts, does it follow that the courts must determine Congress's power
to pass the statute only as it was passed by Congress and signed by the
President? .. . If Clinton and Chadha apply to the judiciary, was not
the Court required to consider the bill wholly, as it was passed and
signed into law?39
Meier answers his question in the context of whether as-applied
challenges, instead of facial challenges, to statutes should be allowed,4 o
but his answer is entirely analogous to the severability discussion in this
Article. Indeed, Meier explicitly invokes Professor Gillian Metzger's
treatment of "statutory severability" and "application severability"' in
arriving at his answer that facial challenges alone should apply:43 An
entire statute should be struck down where the challenge is to the power
of Congress to pass a law (as opposed to a possible violation of an
individual right), or where the challenge is to certain applications of a
35. Id. at 27 n.i18.
36. Tribe uses the example, drawn from Chadha, of a one-house legislative veto that is not
actually exercised. Id. at 24.
37. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956-58 (1983).
38. Tribe, supra note 3, at 22-23.
39. Luke Meier, Facial Challenges and Separation of Powers, 85 IND. L.J. 1557, 1591 (2010).
40. Id. at 1558.
41. Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 88o, 887-88
(2005).
42. Meier, supra, note 39, at 1571.
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law rather than a specific clause in the bill.43 Meier attempts to rescue
severability treatment in those instances where a specific clause in a bill
is held to be unconstitutional and any instance where a law is not alleged
to exceed congressional promulgation authority." His effort at limiting
the logical force of Chadha and Clinton in this way is not convincing,
though his effort at extending the logic of those cases to the judicial
branch is irrefutable. He appears motivated, at least in part, by the desire
to claim that his thesis, "limited to the congressional power context,
would actually necessitate the overruling of only a very few Supreme
Court cases."45 I would rather see the Court consistently follow the logic
of its opinions in Chadha and Clinton.
Considering the two distinctions made by Meier and Metzger,
neither compel the continuance of severability in any context. If a statute
reaches different kinds of behavior or groups of persons, and is
unconstitutional insofar as it reaches one specific kind of behavior or
group of persons, when a court allows the statute to continue in force it
ignores the possible legislative bargain that might very well have led to
the legislation being passed in the first place. Cutting judges salaries may
have been an essential part of the bargain to get the votes to cut
legislators' and executive branch members' salaries. As a matter of the
legislative bargain, a statute saying "all federal employees' salaries are
cut by ten percent" is identical to one that says: "The following groups of
federal employees shall have their salaries cut by ten percent:
(a) legislative branch; (b) executive branch; and (c) judicial branch." As
above, I can put aside the legislative bargain argument, however, and
present the Chadha/Clinton syllogism more succinctly: this is a legislative
result but it (the final outcome after the court has ruled) did not pass
both houses of Congress and receive the President's signature.
As to the second distinction, whether a statute is unconstitutional
because it exceeds congressional power or because it violates individual
rights, it should be immediately clear that the Chadha/Clinton syllogism
is agnostic as to the source of the unconstitutionality. Indeed, in the
foregoing example, I confound the two possible sources of
unconstitutionality: the law is unconstitutional because it applies to one
group, judges, as to which the Congress lacks the authority to lower pay.
Lastly, consider Metzger's distinction, once more in the context of
an as-applied and facial constitutional challenge. She upholds the
availability of as-applied challenges, or, as the context of this Article
would say, severability, in both cases: where a law is unconstitutional in
some applications, and where a law is unconstitutional in some specific
43. Id. at 1596.
44. Id. at 1597.
45. Id.
[Vol. 62: 14951504
SEVERABILITY OF STATUTES
clause.46 Yet, as Meier notes,47 Metzger expresses strong reservations
about severability in the former instance.#" "Application severability" is
no different from "statutory severability" when measured under the
Chadha/Clinton lens. In both instances, a legislative result is reached that
Congress did not pass.
II. TRADITIONAL DEFENSES OF SEVERABILITY FAIL TO JUSTIFY ITS
CONTINUED USE
The various arguments for preserving severability practice are
unavailing. They are: (I) that Congress (often) wants the rest of a bill to
continue in force; (2) that severability analysis is no different from the
traditional common law practice of reformation of a contract when a
term is unenforceable; (3) that it would jeopardize the efficient operation
of government to enjoin entire bills when only part is unconstitutional;
and (4) that it is disrespectful to a co-equal branch for a court to stop the
effectiveness of all of a bill when part is unconstitutional and the rest can
be made to work.
A. ACQUIESCING TO CONGRESS' SUPPOSED DESIRE TO RETAIN THE
REMAINDER OF THE LAW WHEN A PORTION Is HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
IS IMPROPER
The Supreme Court held in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock that "[t]he
final test, for legislative veto[e]s as well as for other provisions, is the
traditional one: the unconstitutional provision must be severed" and the
rest of the bill allowed to stand, "unless the statute created in its absence
is legislation that Congress would not have enacted." 49
In deciding whether Congress would have passed the law without
the unconstitutional part, the court considers the legislative bargain as
well as the structure of the surviving law."o While a court might lay decent
claim to being able to evaluate whether a statute is capable of
functioning with or without a particular provision," the court can have no
46. Metzger, supra note 41, at 931-32.
47. Meier, supra note 39, at 1592.
48. Metzger, supra note 41, at 885 ("Intuitively, application severability may have been a judicial
endeavor of more dubious legitimacy, as a court must draw lines not found in the statute's language.").
49. 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987).
50. See id. ("Thus, it is not only appropriate to evaluate the importance of the veto in the original
legislative bargain, but also to consider the nature of the delegated authority that Congress made
subject to a veto. Some delegations of power to the Executive or to an independent agency may have
been so controversial or so broad that Congress would have been unwilling to make the delegation
without a strong oversight mechanism.").
51. A functional analysis of whether the remaining parts of a bill create a coherent scheme is
often undertaken by a court in severability analysis. See id. at 684. "Congress could not have intended
a constitutionally flawed provision to be severed from the remainder of the statute if the balance of
the legislation is incapable of functioning independently." Id. However, this analysis is only a way of
getting at the fundamental question of whether Congress or the state legislature would have passed
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real knowledge of which bargains were essential to arrive at a final
legislative product. Yet that is what it must presume to know in order to
make the severability determination." Even if the legislative history were
pellucid regarding a particular bill,53 it would not record the quid pro quo
reached by leading legislators between bills.54 Limiting consideration to
the legislative history of a single bill, even supposing the court could
actually find a quid pro quo, it could not evaluate for how many
legislators the quid pro quo might have been essential, or even whether
the seeming compromise was in response to a bluff or a real threat to
withhold support. Legislative history is doubtful enough in attempting to
resolve the meaning of ambiguous words." To rely upon it to discern
what was and was not essential to obtain passage of a bill is almost
entirely speculation.
Congress and state legislatures will often include a severability
clause in a bill, stating that it is their wish that, if part of the bill being
passed is struck down as unconstitutional, the rest shall continue in
force." Even in the absence of such an explicit clause, some authors have
advocated for a presumption of severability, absent a clear statement in
the law to the contrary." Others have distinguished inseverability clauses
from severability clauses, holding that inseverability clauses should be
strictly respected, while severability clauses might be overcome by a
reviewing court.' However, the presence of a severability clause should
the bill without the unconstitutional part.
52. For a useful description of that task, from which one can readily infer the difficulty of
undertaking it in a conscientious manner, see NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 2 STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONsTRucTIoN § 44:6 (7th ed. 2010) ("Courts have developed supplementary tests to
more precisely adduce legislative intent. Some courts uphold the valid portion of a statute when the
invalid portion was not the inducement for passage of the act. Conversely, where the invalid portion
was the principal inducement for the passage of the statute, the whole statute must fail. In ruling that
the legislature would not have enacted separately the valid part of a statute, courts describe the valid
and invalid parts of the act as having been conditions, considerations, or compensations for each other.
To render an entire act void, the invalid part of the act need not be the sole inducement for passage of
the act, but it must be an inducing cause in some important aspect." (citations omitted)).
53. The inquiry, as the Court in Alaska Airlines put it, is whether there is evidence that Congress
would not have wanted a statute with part excised. See 48o U.S. at 685. We know, however, that
Congress did not want such a bill; it wanted what it passed. How do we count the votes for something
that was not ever put to a vote?
54. For example, "Add this item in the relevant appropriation bill for my district, and I will vote
for the comprehensive legislation my party is pushing on the floor at the same time." Such a deal
would not be discoverable in any legislative history search.
55. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmties. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 7o4-08
(1995); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
56. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 443 (4th ed. 2007) (providing examples) ("A ... provision often found at
the end of a bill is a severability clause, which seeks to preserve provisions of the proposed legislation if
other provisions are invalidated.").
57. See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 3, at 259.
58. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 3, at 917-18.
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not change the conclusion that it is perilous to assume Congress wanted
the outcome of severability. There are two reasons for this. First, after
Chadha it is unconstitutional for Congress to pass a law allowing several
legislative results, leaving an agent other than the full Congress plus the
President to pick which one will become law." Second, it is often not
believable that Congress, or a state legislature, had actually considered
all the various permutations of a multiprovisioned bill and decided they
would vote in favor of all of them.
i. A Severability Clause Violates Chadha's Prohibition of
Legislating Outside of the Traditional Legislative Process
When Congress or a state legislature includes a severability clause, it
is as though it enacted a preamble that read as follows:
The Legislative Branch, having considered all possible permutations of
the clauses in this bill, realizes that any one of those clauses might be
struck down by the courts as being unconstitutional. Having considered
all possible outcomes, we hereby state that all of them are valid
legislation, and that we are today passing all of those variations as well
as the text that the public can actually see, with the final resolution of
what law we actually passed to be decided by a court.
Chadha made it clear that it is unconstitutional to allow a body
other than the full Congress to create law. In Chadha, Congress passed a
law, but allowed a single house of Congress to alter an outcome.6 The
Supreme Court ruled that only both houses of Congress, followed by the
President's signature, or two thirds of both houses of Con ress, following
the President's veto, could effectuate a legislative result. ' Even though
Congress passed, by all appropriate legislative steps, a scheme that
anticipated a legislative result caused by the action of a single house, it
could not do so constitutionally. Passing the hypothetical preamble
language I suggested is the same thing. Congress, by all appropriate
legislative steps, would be adopting a scheme that anticipates a legislative
result caused by the action of something different from both houses of
Congress. That, Chadha teaches, it cannot do.
2. Severability Relies on the Improbable Assumption That Congress
Has Considered and Approved All Possible Permutations
The unbelievable part of a severability clause is due to the fact that,
if each part of a multiprovisioned bill is potentially severable, the
permutations are so numerous that it defies reason to infer that Congress
59. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956-59 (1983). For discussion of an alternative criticism,
based on the nondelegation doctrine, see Kameny, supra note 3, at ios8 (arguing that an inseverability
clause is an unconstitutional delegation of authority by Congress to the judicial branch).
6o. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944.
61. Id. at 958.
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had confronted all of them and found them all acceptable. Take the
number of clauses that a statute contains, raise the number two to that
power, and that is the number of possible outcomes from severability.62 It
is unbelievable that Congress actually considered all such permutations
of a multi-provisioned bill.63
Severability has its genesis in the common law of contracts, where a
court will, in equity, grant reformation to change the words of a contract
when it is incapable of being applied as written.64 In that common law
tradition, however, reviewing courts put a heavy burden upon the party
claiming that the parties' actual agreement differed from what was
contained in the written agreement.6 ' Respecting that common law
origin, courts should be hesitant, at the least, to leap to the conclusion
that Congress or a state legislature wished a result other than the one it
actually passed.
62. A bill with ten substantive sections, for instance, would have 1024 possible permutations.
Even in the presence of a severability clause, it is not realistic to take Congress at its word that, in
passing one version, it had contemplated and approved 1023 other versions that would be acceptable
as a back-up. Of course, I recognize that only some of the sections might be constitutionally in doubt.
If, say, four of them are, we still have to believe Congress considered fifteen alternatives to the version
it actually passed, and approved each one.
63. Max Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARv. L. REV. 388, 419 (1942) ("Are we really to
imagine that the legislature had, as it says it had, weighed each paragraph literally and come to the
conclusion that it would have enacted that paragraph if all the rest of the statute were invalid? That
contradicts the ordinary experience of which every citizen takes notice."). By contrast, some are
seemingly willing to accept that assumption. See Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 1o7 COLUM. L. REV.
303, 371 (2007) ("[A] severability clause is general. In one fell swoop, the legislature can enact a
fallback for every possible constitutional ruling invalidating the enactment in whole or in part....");
Shumsky, supra note 3, at 254 ("Given that Congress evaluates hundreds of statutory permutations
during the lawmaking process, considering seven, twenty, or even fifty possible post-severance
permutations is certainly within its institutional capacity."). What is missing in these arguments, of
course, is that Congress actually voted on such alternatives, even granting the (to me incredible)
assumption that somewhere in the legislative process, as many as fifty alternative postseverance
permutations were considered. Shumsky offers another way out of the permutation problem,
suggesting that Congress occasionally legislates in broad terms, intending the courts to develop
"federal common law," as in antitrust. Id. at 253. However, leaving broad terms to court interpretation
is not the same thing as passing terms in a law that Congress is then assumed to be willing to see
excised.
64. See infra Part II.B.
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 155(c) (1981) ("Because experience teaches that
mistakes are the exception and not the rule, the trier of the facts should examine the evidence with
particular care when it relates to a party's assertion of mistake as the basis for his claim or defense.
Care is all the more necessary when the asserted mistake relates to a writing, because the law of
contracts, as is indicated by the parol evidence rule and the Statute of Frauds, attaches great weight to
the written expression of an agreement. This is commonly summarized in a standard that requires the
trier of the facts to be satisfied by 'clear and convincing evidence' before reformation is granted. Each
case must, however, turn on its particular facts, and the evidentiary weight to be attached to a writing
will depend, in part, on its inherent credibility in the light of those facts.").
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3. A Clear Statement Rule in Favor of Severability Is
Distinguishable from Other Clear Statement Rules
The rule in favor of severability has been defended by the Supreme
Court as one of the "clear statement" rules; that is, a presumption that
will be applied unless Congress makes it quite clear it wants the contrary
result." Under this rubric, Congress is assumed to want severability
unless it speaks explicitly to the contrary. The foregoing arguments
against according deference to a severability clause apply with even
greater force to a clear statement rule, because in the case of such a rule
Congress has not even spoken as it has with a severability clause. In
addition, there is a special reason why a clear statement rule is
inappropriate for severability.
Among the clear statement rules is the rule that a state does not
waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity and Congress does not use its
Fourteenth Amendment power to abrogate a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity unless Congress says so explicitly.6 Other such
rules include: that a statute will be applied prospectively only,6 that a
private party shall not have the right to enforce a statute,6 and that a
federal statute does not reach extraterritorially.o
There is a difference between severability and all other clear
statement rules. The other clear statement rules add to a statute a
provision about which the drafters chose to remain silent. It is arguable
that Congress would have intended the result reached, had it chosen to
address the question. Most likely, the legislative drafters in Congress
really did not care about the issue, as they left it silent, and could live
with either outcome. In that context, all we would want from a clear
statement rule is consistency. Let the Court say that silence means
prospective application of a law, for example; when Congress is silent,
that is what we will get. It does not strain the legal fiction past breaking
to infer that Congress was aware that such an outcome would follow
from its silence.
None of this is true in the case of severability, however. With
severability, the statute is not assumed to have an additional clause, such
as "application of this law shall be prospective only," or "this law shall
66. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987). The presumption for severability
is a strong one; even when Congress is explicit that inseverability is to be the rule, courts have on
occasion felt free to ignore that direction. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 906; see also Nagle, supra
note 3, at 259 (favoring a presumption of severability as a clear statement rule).
67. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 240 (1985).
68. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264 (994).
69. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001); see also TOM CAMPBELL, SEPARATION OF
POWERS IN PRACTICE 56 (2oo4) (citing cases).
70. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
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only apply to conduct within the United States." The statute is not added
to; rather, a part of the statute is removed. It is thereby organically
changed. A provision that Congress explicitly wanted in the law, and
which Congress put in the law, has now been removed. This is not a case
of Congress being inattentive to a matter such as retroactivity or
extraterritoriality. Rather, Congress has been very attentive: it has
explicitly passed a bill with the specific language now to be excised.
Assuming that Congress would be amenable to removing this language
flies in the face of what Congress actually did. That is not true for any
other clear statement rule.
In the other cases of clear statement rules, Congress chose to pass a
law without that specific provision. The court is involved in making
explicit what Congress can reasonably have been assumed to make
implicit. Congress is on notice of what a court will do. If Congress stays
silent, it knows that a provision such as "application of this law shall be
prospective only" will be "added" should the matter come up in court. In
the case of severability, however, the clear statement rule results in a
product that we know with one hundred percent certainty was not what
Congress thought it was passing. This is not a matter of implying what
Congress' silence meant; Congress was not silent.
The Court has actually changed its clear statement rule regarding
severability. In 1932, in Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission
of Oklahoma, the Court reaffirmed its nineteenth century cases holding
that silence would imply severability: "Unless it is evident that the
legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its
power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be
dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law."" Four years later, in
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., the Court made inseverability the effect of
silence, stating:
In the absence of [a severability] provision, the presumption is that the
legislature intends an act to be effective as an entirety-that is to say,
the rule is against the mutilation of a statute; and if any provision be
unconstitutional, the presumption is that the remaining provisions fall
with it."
The presumption of inseverability was upheld two years later," but then
in 1968, the Court moved back to its 1932 formulation, declaring that the
default would be severability.74 Further, the Court felt free to ignore any
explicit severability or inseverability clauses that Congress or a state
71. 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932).
72. 298 U.S. 238, 312 (1936).
73. Elec. Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 434 (1938) (holding that a severability
provision "reverses the presumption of inseparability").
74. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 & n.27 (1968); see Shumsky, supra note 3, 241(dating the return to the presumption of severability not until Alaska Airlines in 1987).
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legislature might have included:" "[W]hatever relevance such an explicit
clause might have in creating a presumption of severability, the ultimate
determination of severability will rarely turn on the presence or absence
of such a clause."76
With this history, it is not much to ask the Court to revert to a
previous position in favor of inseverability. Its language in Carter Coal
about the "mutilation of a statute" caused by severability is quite
accurate." I do urge the Court to go beyond Carter Coal, however, and
hold that inseverability should be the rule in all cases, even when
Congress or a state legislature has inserted a severability clause. The
severability context is inappropriate for a clear statement rule of any
kind.
Professor Kevin Walsh has suggested a new clear statement rule for
severability that would require Congress or a state legislature to adopt
explicitly an alternative, fallback version of a law, or else the entire law
would be invalidated when part was held unconstitutional.7 ' There are
many bases to criticize "fallback law," principally that it is unlikely to
occur. In practice, it is difficult to imagine Congress or a state legislature
spending statutory resources preparing permutations of its bills,
especially when it has no advance suspicion of which parts or applications
of its law will be held unconstitutional. The sheer number of permutations
also makes the suggestion unworkable. As even a short and simple piece
of legislation could be held unconstitutional in application, Congress or
the state legislature would have to imagine how a law might apply to any
75. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 52, § 44:8 ("Because of the frequency with which it is used, the
separability clause is regarded as little more than a mere formality. Judicial attitudes towards such
provisions have sometimes been disrespectful: 'The act in question contains a "saving clause," which it
seems customary nowadays to insert in all legislation with the apparent hope that it may work some
not quite understood magic.' In the seminal case of Dorchy v. State of Kansas, Justice Brandeis set out
the rule giving separability clauses their widest efficacy. By this authority the clause provides a rule of
construction to aid in determining legislative intent, 'but it is an aid merely; not an inexorable
command.' This doctrine has been followed by subsequent federal cases and approved in some state
courts." (footnotes omitted)).
76. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 585 n.27 (citing Elec. Bond, 303 U.S. at 434).
77. See Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 312.
78. With a rule of never severing, it would become immaterial whether Congress or a state
legislature has inserted an inseverability clause into a bill. As their having done so has not compelled
reviewing courts to feel bound, in any event, a change at the level of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence, rather than advice to Congress and state legislatures, is what is necessary to effectuate
the recommendation of this Article. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 917-18 (suggesting that legislatures
may choose not to include inseverability clauses because courts do not defer to them).
79. Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV- 738,784 (2010). Professor Dorf
advances the criticism that Congress is unlikely to spend resources creating permutations of bills, as
well as many other criticisms of "fallback law." Dorf, supra note 63. Still, Dorf offers a "yellow light
for fallback law, not a red one." Id. at 370. It is unclear whether, were Walsh convinced that fallback
law is an unworkable expedient, he would retreat to the existing law on severability, or abolish
severability. The fact that he wanted to create an escape clause suggests hesitation on his part to
embrace full abolition of severability.
July 2o0 1] 1511
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
group protected as a suspect class, or to any conduct potentially affecting
interstate and intrastate commerce differently, or to any of a myriad of
other potentially unconstitutional distinctions.
Further, Congress or the legislature may need to know why its
previous effort was unconstitutional before fashioning a fallback
alternative. The basis for the ruling might prevent a fallback from being
constitutional as well, suggesting a different fallback if only Congress or
the legislature knew. This makes fallback alternatives impossible to
fashion in advance.
B. SEVERABILITY Is NOT THE SAME PRACTICE AS REFORMATION OF A
CONTRACT AT COMMON LAW
The origin of the severability doctrine appears to be an extension of
the common law contracts principle that a court will try to save as much
of a contract as it can after having held part of the contract
unenforceable:" "If the parties are mistaken with respect to the legal
effect of the language that the have used, the writing may be reformed
to reflect the intended effect." However, if "the parties make a written
agreement that they would not otherwise have made because of a
mistake other than one as to expression, the court will not reform a
writing to reflect the agreement that it thinks they would have made.",8
Substituting "Congress," for "the parties," makes these two excerpts
from the Restatement (Second) of Contracts appear very similar to the
rule of severability of statutes announced by the Court in Alaska
Airlines.'
The earliest Supreme Court case to announce the severability
doctrine was an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall in Bank of Hamilton v.
Lessee of Dudley.8' His opinion for the Court dealt with a land
8o. See Movsesian, supra note 3, at 43 ("Since the mid-nineteenth century, when they began to
address the question seriously, courts have analyzed the severability of statutory provisions under a
contracts approach. That is, in determining the severability of unconstitutional statutory provisions,
courts have applied essentially the same test they employ to determine the severability of illegal
contract terms. In contracts law, severability turns on the intent of the parties to the agreement. A
court will sever an illegal term and enforce the remainder of an otherwise valid contract where the
court concludes the term was not 'an essential part of the agreed exchange,' that is, where the court
concludes the parties would have made the agreement even without the illegal term." (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § I84() (1981) (footnotes omitted)).
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 155 cmt. a (1981). As an equitable doctrine,
reformation of a contract was not required; it was simply available to a court. See id. § 155 cmt. d.("Since the remedy of reformation is equitable in nature, a court has the discretion to withhold it, even
if it would otherwise be appropriate, on grounds that have traditionally justified courts of equity in
withholding relief."). Accordingly, in urging that courts not apply severability to statutes, I do not
violate any rule that would be followed by courts in the area of contract from which the severability
doctrine was drawn.
82. Id. § 155 cmt. b.
83. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987).
84. 27 U.S. 492 (1829).
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conveyance and an effort to use the powers of equity to overcome an
impediment in the legal scheme set up by Ohio.8' In other words, it was a
case deeply steeped in common law doctrine." Because equity was
available to effectuate the purpose of the Ohio statute, when part of that
statute was held to violate the Seventh Amendment, Marshall opined
that the rest of that statute should be held to apply.8
Other early cases applying severability analysis also occurred in the
context of the resolution of claims to personal property. Accordingly, the
appeal of using common law approaches such as contract reformation
was strong. The analogy between reforming a contract with some
impossible or illegal provisions and interpreting a statute with an
unconstitutional provision is inexact, however. In light of a problem
arising after the contract was written, the function of a court, using its
equitable powers, is to put the parties (or their heirs and assigns) in as
close a position as possible to what the original contract intended. It is an
attempt to preserve the relative benefits and burdens between two
parties: "Their mistake is one as to expression-one that relates to the
contents or effect of the writing that is intended to express their
85. A piece of property had been conveyed by action of an Ohio statute to the administrators of
an intestate estate. Id. at 520. Prior to the sale of that piece of property, the Ohio law had been repealed.
Id. at 521. Nevertheless, the sale went ahead, and the purchaser made valuable improvements on the
property. Id. at 524. Another Ohio law prescribed that in such a circumstance, the eventual
conveyance of the land to its rightful owner (the intestate successor) would have to include payment to
the intermediate holder for any improvements made. Id. at 525. The value of those improvements was
to be decided by appointed commissioners, not by a jury. Id. This was held to violate the Seventh
Amendment, since the value of improvements was an issue that, at common law, had to be decided by
a jury. Id. The intermediate owner could still get compensation under the Ohio law, however, because
the intermediate owner could apply to the equity side of the Ohio courts. Id. A state court sitting in
equity could appoint the commissioners, and enjoin the conveyance of title until the value of the
improvements, as evaluated by those commissioners, had been paid to the intermediate land owner.
Id. at 525-26. What is most instructive about this first enunciation of the doctrine of severability by the
Court (interestingly, in construing a state law) is its similarity to contract law. It was as though two
parties had agreed to a conveyance of land between them by contract. One method of evaluating a
part of the contract was impossible to effectuate. However, a court sitting in equity could find another
way of making the evaluation. This, the court was instructed to do, so that the contract could go ahead
and achieve its fundamental purpose.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 155 cmt. a (1981).
87. Bank of Hamilton, 27 U.S. at 526.
88. See, e.g., Huntington v. Worthen, 120 U.S. 97, 102 (1887) ("The unconstitutional part of the
statute was separable from the remainder. The statute declared that, in making its statement of the value
of its property, the railroad company should omit certain items; that clause being held invalid, the rest
remained unaffected, and could be fully carried out. An exemption, which was invalid, was alone
taken from it. It is only when different clauses of an act are so dependent upon each other that it is
evident the legislature would not have enacted one of them without the other-as when the two things
provided are necessary parts of one system-that the whole act will fall with the invalidity of one
clause. When there is no such connection and dependency, the act will stand, though different parts of
it are rejected.").
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agreement-and the appropriate remedy is reformation of that writing
properly to reflect their agreement."
Entirely different is the case where a portion of a statute is held
unconstitutional. Here, the body most interested-Congress, or the
relevant state legislature-is a continuing body, whose present
incarnation can speak authoritatively to public policy, without concern
about any other contracting party. The balancing of interests that led to
the original statute is completely irrelevant to the decision of Congress or
the state legislature as to what is the best public policy today. The
members of that prior Congress-if, implausibly, they could all be
summoned and speak with one voice-would lack standing. There is a
constitutional successor-in-interest: the current Congress or state
legislature. Returning the matter to them, by denying severability and
striking down an entire statute, is entirely possible. By contrast, in the
case of common law reformation, returning the contract to the parties
would not be fair. There are two different parties who continue to exist,
but whose relative positions of bargaining strength will have changed at
least somewhat from the time they struck their bargain. Hence, a
reviewing court could not summon the two parties and simply say,
"Make a new contract now if you wish because the old one is no good,"
without giving unfair advantage to one side or the other whose position
had improved in the intervening years. A court, however, may do that to
Congress or a state legislature. There is no unfairness in failing to honor
an earlier agreement because the party that made the agreement, the
earlier Congress or state legislature, has entirely devolved its authority to
a new body, existing in the present.
Other commentators have criticized the analogy of severability to
contract reformation, but have accepted the basic notion that a bill
represents a bargain among legislators, and a court sets about trying to
protect the benefit of that bargain.' The fault lies in how difficult it is to
ascertain the legislative bargain.9 1 My view is different." The analogy to
contract is flawed even if we know perfectly well what the legislators'
bargain was. That bargain became a bill whose author is not two separate
parties, but the legislative body itself.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 155 cmt. a (1981).
90. See, e.g., Movsesian, supra note 3, at 58-71.
91. Id. at 69. Movsesian argues that the statute itself is the agreement, whereas in a contract, the
writing is merely evidence of the agreement; hence, it is perilous to attempt to ascertain the bargain
from legislative history. Id.
92. Movsesian additionally argues against the contract analogy by noting that average citizens,
who are affected by statutes, cannot easily research legislative intent; whereas the parties to a contract
can easily research their own intent. Id. at 69-73. This point strikes me as undeniable, but open to the
rebuttal that once a court has construed an ambiguous statute by doing its research into legislative
intent, the statute's effect will have been clarified. Indeed, severability will make clear which parts
remain and which don't. If we abolish severability entirely, which I am advocating, the result would be
even clearer and easier for the public to understand.
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Once separated from the analogy to common law reformation of
contracts, the doctrine of severability has no claim to legitimacy. As the
Supreme Court repeated the doctrine, with slight variations, in the
nineteenth century, it never provided a new or better premise.' Rather,
the rule was repeated with the occasional comment that it was
commonplace, or so well understood as not to require elaboration.' This
was true whether the Court held for inseverability or severability as the
default rule.
In the years following Bank of Hamilton, the Supreme Court went
the other direction in several important cases, holding unconstitutional
provisions inseverable from the rest of a statute, and so striking down
statutes in their entirety.95 The Court sometimes held simply that the
intent of Congress or the legislature could not be effectuated by what
was left of the statute after excising the unconstitutional part.9 That,
93. See, e.g., The Trade-Mark Cases, oo U.S. 82, 98-99 (1879); Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 8o,
83-84 (1880); Huntington v. Worthen, 120 U.S. 97, 102 (1887).
94. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649,695-96 (1892).
95. See, e.g., Allen, lo3 U.S. at 83-86.
96. See id. (striking down the entirety of a Missouri law authorizing a municipal bond because
part of that law violated the Missouri Constitution, which required a prior vote by the legislature). The
Court in Allen stated:
It is an elementary principle that the same statute may be in part constitutional and in
part unconstitutional, and that if the parts are wholly independent of each other, that which
is constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected. "But," as
was said by Chief Justice Shaw, in Warren v. Mayor and Aldermen of Charlestown, "if they
are so mutually connected with and dependent on each other, as conditions, considerations,
or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as
a whole, and that, if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the
residue independently, and some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are
thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them." The point to be determined
in all such cases is whether the unconstitutional provisions are so connected with the general
scope of the law as to make it impossible, if they are stricken out, to give effect to what
appears to have been the intent of the legislature.
Id. at 83-84 (citation omitted). Actually, the citation to Massachusetts Chief Justice Shaw's opinion in
Warren was to a headnote. See 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84, 84 (1854). The relevant part of his actual opinion
for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was as follows:
Before proceeding to consider the objections separately, we are all of opinion, that if this
act be unconstitutional at all it is not in any separate and independent enactments, but in the
entire scope and purpose of the act. The object of the act is the annexation; the merger of
one municipality, and the enlargement of the other. This must necessarily affect the
municipal and political rights of the inhabitants of both, guaranteed as they are by the
constitution. The legislature manifestly felt it to be their duty, in accomplishing this object,
to make provision for the preservation of these constitutional rights; if this object is not
effectually accomplished, we have no ground on which to infer that the legislature would
have sanctioned such annexation and its consequences. The various provisions of the act,
therefore, all providing for the consequences of such annexation, more or less immediate or
remote, are connected and dependent; the different provisions of the act look to one object
and its incidents, and are so connected with each other, that if its essential provisions are
repugnant to the constitution, the entire act must be deemed unconstitutional and void.
Id. at 99-io0.
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however, was not the only rationale. The Court also emphasized that
severability would lead to the creation of a law that Congress or the state
legislature had, in fact, not passed.97 That point of view should be
embraced again: "If we should, in the case before us, undertake to make
by judicial construction a law which Congress did not make, it is quite
probable we should do what, if the matter were now before that body, it
would be unwilling to do . . . ."
C. SEVERABILITY Is NOT COMPELLED BY EFFICIENCY OF GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS
In holding for severability, the Court has emphasized the disastrous
effect of striking down a large complex of statutory provisions because of
the infirmity of some.9" In the tariff case of Field v. Clark, the Court did
not allow the unconstitutionality of a provision for bounties to be paid
for the domestic production of sugar, which was contained in a larger
statute that also imposed tariffs on imports, to jeopardize the continued
applicability of the tariff provisions of the bill, lest federal revenues bejeopardized:
While, in a general sense, both may be said to be parts of a system,
neither the words nor the general scope of the act justifies the belief
that Congress intended they should operate as a whole, and not
separately for the purpose of accomplishing the objects for which they
were respectively designed. Unless it is impossible to avoid it, a general
revenue statute should never be declared inoperative in all its partsbecause a particular part relating to a distinct subject may be invalid. Adifferent rule might be disastrous to the financial operations of the
government, and produce the utmost confusion in the business of the
entire country.'-
The plaintiff, Marshall Field & Co., had sued to get a refund for
import duties on woolen clothing, arguing that the import duties were
imposed by the President in an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority.o' Marshall Field & Co. also argued that the tariff act's
provision for subsidies for domestic production of sugar was beyond
congressional authority to enact.o2
As there was one omnibus bill including both sugar subsidies and
tariff provisions, the effect of the position I am advocating would have
required holding the tariff provisions inapplicable if the sugar subsidies
97. The Trade-Mark Cases, ioo U.S. at 99.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Field, 143 U.S. at 69"7.
ioo. Id.
ioi. Id. at 665-67, 681.
102. Id. at 695. A third challenge was raised as well: that the bill had not followed the prescribed
form of enactment and enrollment in both houses. Id. at 668-69. The Court rejected that argument, id.
at 680, and the nondelegation-based challenge, id. at 692-93, but did not reach the sugar subsidy point
because it was severable. Id. at 695-97.
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were unconstitutional (a point the Court did not reach), and if, contrary
to the facts of the case, Marshall Field & Co. were harmed by the sugar
subsidy. Suppose, however, that a party with standing raised a successful
challenge to the sugar subsidy. It would not follow that the federal
government would suddenly be bereft of tariff revenues, then a large part
of the federal treasury. The Court could stay the effect of its ruling to
allow a reasonable time for Congress to reenact the tariff statute without
the sugar subsidy.'" Nor would striking down the entire act, import tariffs
and all, result in refunds to all importers. The jurisprudence on
nonretroactivity allows for a result that would not put the public treasury
at risk. Even though the Court's holdings have shifted, from Chevron Oil
Co. v. Husonio4 in 1971 to Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxationo' in
1993, in favor of retroactively holding a tax unconstitutional, the Chevron
Court's reference to equitable considerations" would in all likelihood
continue to govern a claim made for a refund based on having paid tax
under a provision whose constitutionality was not challenged.
Retroactivity of tax refund claims is a doctrine already showing such
malleability as not to preclude an accommodation to a new approach to
severability.
In other contexts, in addition to raising revenue for the government
it might be that ending the severability doctrine would cause some
inconvenience as Congress was compelled to reconsider passing laws that
1o3. A recent example of a federal court using this power dealt with an unconstitutional
Washington state law allowing in-state wineries and breweries to self-distribute, but requiring out-of-
state competitors to use an in-state distributor. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Hoen, 4o7 F. Supp. 2d 1247,
1256 (W.D. Wash. 2005). Either extending the requirement of an independent distributor to in-state
wineries and breweries, or extending the benefit of self distribution to out-of-state wineries and
breweries, could have remedied the discrimination. Id. at 1254. The trial court stayed its judgment to
allow the state legislature the time to choose which solution it preferred:
The Washington Wine Institute argues that the Court should "stay the enforcement of
its order for a period sufficient to permit the Washington legislature to act on the matter."
The Court agrees. The constitutional defects in the current Washington system present a
policy choice between two alternatives, a decision that is within the discretion of the State
Legislature. Regardless of the remedy chosen by the Court, the State Legislature could
simply choose to adopt the other remedy during the upcoming legislative session, which
starts in early January 2oo6. Therefore, the Court will stay the entry of judgment on this
claim until April 14, 2oo6 to provide the Washington State Legislature with a sufficient
period of time to act on this matter.
Id. at 1256 (citing Population Servs. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321, 340-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)) (citation
omitted).
104. 404 U.S. 97, o6-7 (97) (holding that a state law's statute of limitations should not apply
retroactively).
105. 509 U.S. 86,97 (1993).
io6. See Chevron, 404 U.S. at lo7 ("Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive
application, for '[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if
applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the injustice or hardship by a
holding of nonretroactivity."' (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (internal
quotation marks omitted))).
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otherwise would have been allowed to continue in operation. Perhaps no
recent Supreme Court decision caused so many different laws to be
changed as did Chadha, in which the Court addressed just such a
consequence.'" Admittedly, the Court applied severability analysis so
that all of the affected laws did not have to be repromulgated, but the
widespread nature of the effect of the Court's ruling was explicitly
considered by the majority and by Justice White in dissent.'8
Nevertheless, "the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient,
convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing
alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution," and the fact
that hundreds of statutes were affected by the Court's ruling did not
deter the Court from its holding." If the major conclusion of this Article
is accepted, that courts impermissibly exercise legislative functions when
they engage in severability analysis, then, as in Chadha, inconvenience
should not constitute an obstacle to correcting the flaw I have
described."o
The major effect, therefore, of the rule I propose is to require
Congress to repromulgate so much of the bill that was struck down as it
107. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983) ("The [one-house veto provision] doubtless has
been in many respects a convenient shortcut...."). But see id. at 944 ("Convenience and efficiency are
not the primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of democratic government...
lo8. Id. at 944-45; id. at 967 (White, J., dissenting).
1o9. Id. (majority opinion) ("[Olur inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by the fact that
congressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate
authority to executive and independent agencies: 'Since 1932, when the first veto provision was
enacted into law, 295 congressional veto-type procedures have been inserted in 196 different statutes
as follows: from 1932 to 1939, five statutes were affected; from 194o-49, nineteen statutes; between
1950-59, thirty-four statutes; and from 196o-69, forty-nine. From the year 1970 through 1975, at least
one hundred sixty-three such provisions visions were included in eighty-nine laws."' (quoting James
Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on
Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L. REv. 323,324 (1977))); see also id. at 0oo2-o3 (White, J., dissenting).
Ito. Nevertheless, the widespread use of the legislative veto, and, thus, the need to re-legislate in
many different areas, constituted an argument in favor of severability analysis after the Chadha
decision, in one commentator's view. See Note, supra note 3, at 1182-83; see also Gans, supra note 3, at
653 ("The chief virtue of severability is that it allows a court to create a new law quickly."). To that
comment, I would argue that this is actually severablity's chief vice: it allows a court to create a new
law. Other commentators called for an omnibus congressional fix after Chadha, rather than awaiting
the case-by-case determination of severability. See William F. Leahy, The Fate of the Legislative Veto
After Chadha, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 168, 19o & n.143 (1984); Elliott H. Levitas & Stanley M. Brand,
The Post Legislative Veto Response: A Call to Congressional Arms, 12 HOFsTRA L. REV. 593, 615(1984). Chadha called for the possible invalidation of more federal statutes than virtually any other
modern Supreme Court decision. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 1002 (White, J., dissenting). If the proposal I
am offering is workable in the Chadha context, therefore, it is truly workable. If the Court struck down
every federal statute containing a single-house veto provision, in its entirety, Congress would likely
react by repromulgating many of those statutes; and it is likely the President would sign each such law
as it would entrench Presidential authority. There are some subcategories of statutes, however, that
Congress may not wish to repromulgate without having the legislative veto. The alternative actually
chosen, of course, was a case-by-case determination of whether a statute containing a legislative veto
provision was severable from that provision. The approach I am advocating would have resulted in
much more certainty, much sooner.
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wishes when part of that bill is held unconstitutional. It is not true, as
some commentators fear,"' that denying severability could put an entire
complex statute at risk, or even the entire U.S. Code."' The bill that
passed Congress or the legislature containing the unconstitutional
provision is all that would be at risk, leaving the code section or chapter
unharmed."' Judicial stays, expedited action by Congress, and equitable
use of the doctrine of retroactivity can all mediate any perceived
hardships to the effective functioning of government. Further, as this new
approach took hold, Congress would learn the benefits of enacting
shorter bills. Omnibus bills would jeopardize much; targeted bills would
jeopardize much less. Inducing Congress to pass bills drawn more
narrowly should be viewed as a positive for two separate reasons: the
President would have a more meaningful chance to exercise the veto, and
individual members of Congress would have a more meaningful chance
to express their support for some provisions, and opposition to other
provisions, otherwise contained in an omnibus law."4 Also, a more
limited use of severability-or, as I advocate, complete abolition-would
cause Congress and legislatures to devote more time to writing laws that
are constitutional in the first instance."'
D. IT Is NOT DISRESPECTFUL TO A CO-EQUAL BRANCH TO REFUSE
SEVERABILITY; IN FACT, IT IS QUITE THE OPPOSITE
The Court has explained its approach to severability as a modest
one, motivated by respect for the co-equal branch of Congress or the
iii. See, e.g., Gans, supra note 3, at 653.
112. See Dorf, supra note 63, at 370. Dorf argues:
Why just the provision rather than the Code section, the Code title, or the entire U.S. Code
itself? Because the more extreme of these options are plainly implausible, courts never face
a choice of whether to sever invalid provisions or applications from valid ones, but instead
must always decide how much to sever.
Id. I disagree. The simple test is the bill that passed Congress containing the unconstitutional
provision. There is no issue of whether Congress wanted the rest of the U.S. Code to continue in force,
but there is a very real reason to doubt that Congress wanted a bill other than the one it passed to
become law.
113. See Metzger, supra note 41, at 887 ("[It goes without saying that invalidation of one statute,
even a statute the various provisions of which are held inseparable from each other, does not
invalidate separately enacted or unrelated sections of the U.S. Code.").
114. Recodifications of statutory chapters might be inhibited, however, because as a single bill they
would put at risk the entire chapter of the U.S. Code, including provisions passed in many separate
bills over many different years. A narrow exemption for bills that do no more than recodify existing
statutes would not undermine the general benefit of what I am proposing. These cases should be easy
to tell from omnibus bills that enact new law. To the extent a recodification includes something new,
then that new provision should be separately voted on in any event, in order to allow members of
Congress, and the President, to exercise their respective powers meaningfully. The consequence of the
courts embracing my view on severability will weigh strongly against Congress attempting to add new
provisions to recodifications.
115. See Gans, supra note 3, at 675; Jona, supra note 3, at 713-14.
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sovereign authority of the individual states, as well as by its own
institutional limitations on drafting laws."'6 As noted above, the Court, in
its most recent announcement of severability, explicitly referred to
various ways of curing a constitutional infirmity, and used modest
language: "[S]uch editorial freedom-far more extensive than our
holding today-belongs to the Legislature, not the Judiciary. Congress of
course remains free to pursue any of these options going forward."" This
sounds very deferential."' Four years before, in Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of Northern New England, the Court went to some length to
announce the same motivations underlying its application of severability
analysis:
Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute,
we try to limit the solution to the problem. We prefer, for example, to
enjoin only the unconstitutional applications of a statute while leaving
other applications in force, or to sever its problematic portions while
leaving the remainder intact.
... [W]e try not to nullify more of a legislature's work than is
necessary, for we know that "[a] ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates
the intent of the elected representatives of the people." ....
... [M]indful that our constitutional mandate and institutional
competence are limited, we restrain ourselves from "rewrit[ing] state
law to conform it to constitutional requirements" even as we strive to
salvage it. Our ability to devise a judicial remedy that does not entail
quintessentially legislative work often depends on how clearly we have
already articulated the background constitutional rules at issue and
how easily we can articulate the remedy.... But making distinctions in
a murky constitutional context, or where line-drawing is inherently
complex, may call for a "far more serious invasion of the legislative
domain" than we ought to undertake.
... [T]he touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative intent,
for a court cannot "use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of
the legislature."" 9
I do not doubt the sincerity of the Court's expression of deference. It is,
however, profoundly misplaced.
Which intrudes more into the legislative function: to send a bill back
to Congress to rewrite it because part is unconstitutional; or to rewrite
i16. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1987). Commentators also take
the view that severability is "deferential to legislative policies." See, e.g., Adrian Vermuele, Saving
Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1947 (1997).
117. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138,3162 (2010).
i18. A similar expression of deference is found in the most recent example of the Supreme Court
narrowing the reach of a statute while claiming it is not rewriting it. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct.
2896, 2930 (2010) (noting that the Court's task is "not to destroy the Act... but to construe it"
(quoting Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571 (1973)). But see id. at 2935 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The Court strikes a pose of judicial
humility... .").
ii9. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328-30 (2oo6) (citations
omitted).
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the bill into a form that Congress never approved, based on the court's
best judgment of what Congress would have done originally if it had
been informed of the court's ultimate ruling on constitutionality? The
creation of a new law because of a court ruling intrudes much more
profoundly upon legislative prerogative than telling the legislature that a
previously passed bill is invalid in its entirety. 20 As one commentator
noted in the context of inseverability clauses, bills almost always involve
compromises; and when Congress or the state legislature has explicitly
instructed that a compromise be kept (by requiring all of the provisions
to be voided if any were), a court would show greatest respect by
adhering to the expressed desire of the legislative branch."' Nevertheless,
courts have, from time to time, even ignored inseverability clauses, the
legislature's explicit instruction as to its wish."' How can that be squared
with modesty, or deference to the legislative will?
Even without an inseverability clause, deference to a co-equal
branch requires inseverability. Congress passed a bill with several parts
and even though the product was flawed, Congress should have an
opportunity to fix it. Of course, under existing doctrine, Congress can
always "correct" the re-legislation resulting from the court's application
of severability analysis. What keeps Congress from doing so, however, is
that the court has created a new equilibrium. Political scientists have
shown how difficult it is to move an equilibrium point in public policy,
whereas if an entire approach to a public policy issue has been vitiated,
there is no inertia of an existing solution to overcome."3 Even without
such inertia issues, for the period of time between the striking down of a
statute and Congress's enactment of another, which can be a long time,
120. In an effort to avoid the choice between invalidating an entire statute, and eliminating a part
that was necessary for the bill to pass, Professor Glenn Smith has recommended "plastic surgery." See
Smith, supra note 3, at 461-76. This process would allow a court effectively to add language to a
statute so as to reconstruct what Congress or the state legislature intended, when mere excision would
leave a product that was not intended. Id. at 461-62. It is a candid admission that a reviewing court, in
severability analysis, is, despite protestations, engaged in drafting legislation.
121. Friedman, supra note 3, at 914.
122. See, e.g., Biszco v. RIHT Fin. Corp., 758 F.2d 769 (ist Cir. 1985), discussed in Friedman, supra
note 3, at 907. Friedman found only state law examples of courts ignoring inseverability clauses.
Friedman, supra note 3, at 907.
123. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO.
L.J. 523, 528-33 (1992). See generally, ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 56, at 77-82, and sources cited
therein. The existing policy (status quo) is marked on a policy continuum, and a sequential game is
introduced to analyze the likelihood of moving from that status quo point, depending on the
preferences of the House, Senate, and President. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra, at 529-33. The court, via
severability, would change that initial status quo point. As the preferences of the House, Senate, and
President change over time, especially after intervening elections, there could be a desire to change
the law. However, in the interim, if the court has acted, and through severability analysis changed the
starting point, the result could well be more difficult to change than the starting point would have been
had the law been struck down in its entirety. I need not prove that this is always so, only that it is one
possible outcome, to demonstrate the inadequacy of the argument that Congress can always undo the
court-created product of its constitutionality, and severability, rulings.
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the issue remains as to which law should govern. During such an interval,
which should be the law: the state of the law before the passage of the
statute now held to be unconstitutional, or a version of the law that
Congress never approved?'"
Unintended consequences result when a court tries to second-guess
what Congress would have wanted through severability analysis. After
the Watergate abuses of the 1970s, Congress considered many possible
solutions to what was seen as the influence of money in politics, including
complete disclosure and public financing.' Another solution was to
impose a limit on how much money could be raised in federal elections,
and a limit on how much could be spent as well-the solution that
Congress passed."'
What no one proposed was a rule that would allow individuals who
were wealthy to be able to spend their own money without limit, while
individuals who were not wealthy were restricted, as a practical matter,
to spending what they could raise, with limits on how much they could
raise from any other person. Yet that is the system we now have, after
the Supreme Court struck down the limit on individual expenditure, but
left intact the rest of the statute regarding limits on fundraising.1' Chief
Justice Burger, who dissented on the issue of severability, saw this very
risk."'
124. It is even possible that the legislative outcome, after a court has applied severability, is one
that could never have been achieved through the normal legislative process. This will be the case
where a piece of legislation was the product of a compromise between the executive and legislative
branches. If the court invalidates only one side of a bargain, the side benefitting from the invalidation
has no incentive to agree to corrective legislation. The court will thus have created what would never
otherwise exist. This will also be the case where the legislation was the product of give-and-take
between two blocks of legislators, neither of which had a majority. If the provision struck down was
sought by one group but not the other, there will be no majority to undo the court's recasting of the
bill.
125. See Brief for the Attorney General and the Federal Election Commission, Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. I (976) in 84 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1975 TERM SUPPLEMENT 298, 311, 330 (Philip B.. Kurland & Gerhard
Casper eds., 1976) (discussing disclosure and public financing as alternatives).
126. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 7 (per curiam) (describing the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971).
127. Id. at 143.
128. Id. at 254-55 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("One need not call
problems of this order equal protection violations to recognize that the contribution limitations of the
Act create grave inequities that are aggravated by the Court's interpretation of the Act. The Court's
piecemeal approach fails to give adequate consideration to the integrated nature of this legislation. A
serious question is raised, which the Court does not consider: when central segments, key operative
provisions, of this Act are stricken, can what remains function in anything like the way Congress
intended? The incongruities are obvious.... All candidates can now spend freely; affluent candidates,
after today, can spend their own money without limit; yet, contributions for the ordinary candidate are
severely restricted in amount-and small contributors are deterred. I cannot believe that Congress
would have enacted a statutory scheme containing such incongruous and inequitable provisions."
(footnote omitted)).
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If Congress knew it could not impose spending limits on candidates,
it might well have opted for the alternative approach of disclosure. When
the McCain-Feingold Act'29 was under consideration, the chairman of the
House Administration Committee noted the unintended consequence of
previous Supreme Court rulings on election laws, and recommended an
inseverability clause for the new statute:
[T]he current law is in fact a product of the Supreme Court. It is not a
product of Congress. If my colleagues look at the original Federal
Election Campaign Act, there were a number of areas where the
Congress acted comprehensively, as we are attempting to do now on a
number of these bills. It not only dealt with individual contribution
limits, it dealt with spending limits for elections. Congress passed a
limit per election. Congress passed a limit on independent expenditures
per election....
If my colleagues look down here in terms of limit on candidates'
personal funds, we talk about millionaire candidates and how we have
to deal with that. Congress dealt with that, but the Court overturned
that portion. ...
My point is that for the last quarter of a century we have been
dealing with a law which was not the way the Congress created it. 3 o
Other examples abound."' Over fifty bills that became law with a
legislative veto provision, with power being granted from Congress to the
President, contained an explicit retention of a leash.' Prior to the
129. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 1o7-155, It6 Stat. 81 (codified in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
130. 144 CONG. REC. 12,913 (1998) (statement of Rep. Thomas); see also id. at 13,o03 (proposed
amendment); id. at 12,903, 12,904 (statement of Rep. Frost) (noting the consequence of Buckley and
indicating intent to support inclusion of an inseverability clause to preserve the entire act). The
proposed amendment was not, however, accepted. Id. at 13,003. Representative Frank saw the attempt
to insert an inseverability clause as a Trojan horse, hoping that the entire McCain-Feingold statute
would be struck down because of the constitutional vulnerability of some of its provisions, most likely
its definition of express advocacy. Id. at 12,936-37 (1998) (statement of Rep. Frank). Fred Kameny
voices the same suspicion. Kameny, supra note 3, at 999-ooo. I was privileged to be on the floor of
the House on that day, as a member of Congress, and participated in the debate. My own recollection
was that the inseverability provision was motivated not by any such disingenuous purpose, but rather
by extreme frustration at how the balance of limits on spending and limits on contributions in the
original federal elections law had been undone by the Supreme Court, which, in Buckley essentially
struck down half of the quid pro quo, leaving limits on contributions but no limits on spending.
131. For instance, in Free Enterprise Fund the Court chose from among several possible
constitutional fixes. It chose to remove the independence of the PCAOB, rather than, say, removing
the PCAOB's ability to issue regulations. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163-64 (20Io). However, the independence of the PCAOB was very important to the
Congress that adopted Sarbanes-Oxley. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. 12,115, 12,116 (2002) (statement of
Sen. Sarbanes) ("I believe, frankly, that we need to establish this oversight board in statute in order to
provide an extra guarantee of its independence and its plenary authority to deal with this important
situation."); id. at 12,118, 12,119-20 (statement of Sen. Gramm). Sacrificing the executive functions
rather than the independence of the PCAOB might have been preferred if Congress were made aware
of the need to choose.
132. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1oo3 (1983) (app. to opinion of White, J., dissenting) ("This
compilation, reprinted from the Brief for the United States Senate, identifies and describes briefly
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enactment of each such law, Congress retained the power in question.' 3
Would Congress have given the power to the executive, that it had
possessed and exercised, without retaining some degree of supervision?
Selling weapons to foreign governments, restructuring government
agencies, approving pay for executive and judicial officers, deciding
which foreign nationals could stay in the United States (a decision at
issue in Chadha, and formerly exercised by Congress in the form of
private bills): all these were important powers controlled by Congress.'34
Are we to believe that, after two centuries of exercising such powers,
Congress would, in the twentieth century, surrender them to the
executive, and get nothing in return?'
What was more respectful to Congress's institutional expertise and
constitutional prerogatives: to undo the individual bargain it reached
with the executive in over fifty individual cases, handing the benefit in
each case solely to the executive, or sending the fifty bills back to
Congress to decide whether, and to what extent, it would part with its
power, knowing this time that if it parted with power it could retain no
leash on the executive? Respect for Congress, and for the states'
legislative sovereignty,136 should restrain, not promote, severability. It is
consistent with the courts' duty to say what the law is, the Supreme
current statutory provisions for a legislative veto by one or both Houses of Congress. Statutory
provisions for a veto by Committees of the Congress and provisions which require legislation (i.e.,
passage of a joint resolution) are not included. The 55 statutes in the compilation (some of which
contain more than one provision for legislative review) are divided into six broad categories: foreign
affairs and national security, budget, international trade, energy, rulemaking and miscellaneous.").
Other commentators put the total at more than one hundred. See Steven W. Pelak, Severability of
Legislative Veto Provisions: An Examination of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 743, 745 (1984) ("Approximately 120 federal statutes contain
legislative veto provisions."); Eugene D. Cross, Comment, Legislative Veto Provisions and Severability
Analysis: A Reexamination, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 537, 537 (1986) ("Approximately two hundred
statutes contain legislative veto provisions . . . .").
133. Levitas & Brand, supra note 110, at 611-12.
134. Id. at 612.
135. One commentator answers that question in the affirmative, because of the extra burden
Congress would otherwise have to take on itself. See Jonathan B. Fellows, Note, Congressional
Oversight Through Legislative Veto After INS v. Chadha, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1244, I260 (1984).
However, I and other commentators would answer it strongly in the negative. See, e.g., Smith, supra
note 3, at 399.
136. Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F-3 d 531, 556 (9 th Cir. 2004) ("Severability [of a state
statute] is an issue of state law."). Suppose a state follows the rule of presumptive inseverability. If a
federal court accords deference to such a decision by a state legislature, why would it not accord the
same deference to a congressional declaration of inseverability? In a recent citation to this principle,
another panel of the Ninth Circuit curiously stated that "when the constitutionality of a state statute is
challenged, principles of state law guide the severability analysis and we should strike down only those
provisions which are inseparable from the invalid provisions." Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng,
522 F-3d 874, 886 (9th Cir. 2oo8) (citing Eden, 379 F.3d at 556-57). If a state's jurisprudence holds
against a presumption of severability, however, then the first part of this statement is in conflict with
the second.
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Court's ultimate responsibility to decide issues of constitutionality,
maximum deference to Congress, in which all federal legislative
authority is vested, and to the sovereignty of the states, to let no law be
in force that did not pass the legislative branch. But because of
severability, there are many laws in force today that did not.
CONCLUSION
From 1936 to 1968, the Supreme Court applied a presumption of
inseverability to its interpretation of statutes. 37 The Court should revert
to that practice and make the presumption conclusive. Any other
approach involves courts in doing what was explicitly forbidden in INS v.
Chadha and Clinton v. City of New York: creating a statutory outcome
not approved by both houses of Congress and signed by the President, or
passed over his veto. This suggestion is practical, as it prevailed (in
presumptive form) during the most active legislative epochs in recent
history: the New Deal and the Great Society. It will have the salutary
effect not only of reserving to the legislative branch its proper function of
balancing interests and passing a new law when its original attempt has to
be redone, but also creating the impetus to craft laws more carefully and
more narrowly from the start.
137. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
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